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ABSTRACT   This paper reviews the use of co-production – with state and citizens working together – 
as a grassroots strategy to secure political influence and access resources and services. To date, the 
literature on social movements has concentrated on more explicitly political strategies used by such 
movements to contest for power and influence. Co-production, when considered, is viewed as a strategy 
used by citizens and the state to extend access to basic services with relatively little consideration given 
to its wider political ramifications. However, co-production is used increasingly by grassroots 
organizations and federations as part of an explicit political strategy. This paper examines the use of co-
productive strategies by citizen groups and social movement organizations to enable individual members 
and their associations to secure effective relations with state institutions that address both immediate 
basic needs and enable them to negotiate for greater benefits.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The scale of shelter need is widely accepted. At least 900 million urban residents are in need of improved 
shelter in towns and cities in the global South.(1) This may mean a lack of any one of numerous essential 
services, including regular access to safe water, or access to sanitation and drainage; also a lack of safe 
and secure dwellings, or secure tenure without threat of eviction.. The cause of such a lack of safe and 
secure shelter is related partly to a lack of income, but it is also related to the inability of the state to 
provide a framework within which adequate shelter is plentiful and affordable, and hence access to 
secure tenure and basic needs are met.  
Even if household incomes rise, it is not easy for these urban households to improve their shelter 
options. Shelter is, almost universally, informal for those with low-incomes in the South; in some 
countries, the same is true of those with middle or even high incomes. The sources of informality are 
multiple, including the illegal occupation of land, or its illegal use (e.g. contravening zoning and sub-
division regulations), or the contravention of building regulations. In the absence of state provision, 
much service provision is informal. This means that, if the urban poor are to address their shelter needs at 
scale, a level of engagement with the state is required to reform practices (and standards) and provide 
needed investments. Low-income informal citizens have a variety of strategies to engage the state, and 
equally the state has a variety of strategies to relate to these communities. Each such strategy is 
associated with different political and social processes, favouring different interests and outcomes.  
The concept of co-production has been explored within literature on state and citizen relations in 
the North and South alike. The concept refers to the joint production of public services between citizen 
and state, with any one or more elements of the production process being shared. Co-production has been 
primarily considered as a route to improve the delivery of services, and it has rarely been considered as a 
route through which the organized urban poor may choose to consolidate their local organizational base 
and augment their capacity to negotiate successfully with the state. Nevertheless, there is evidence that 
some grassroots organizations have chosen to go down this route in order to strengthen their political 
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position as well as address their more immediate development needs; and it is this history that is explored 
in this paper. 
Following the introduction, there is a brief review of urban poverty that highlights the need to 
transform local neighbourhoods, and specifically tenure, shelter and services (Section II). This is 
followed by another introductory section that considers the different strategies followed by local 
residents, including self-help and collective political action (Section III). Co-production has rarely been 
considered in political terms, although it has been widely discussed in relation to the provision of state 
services both in the context of North and South. The concept is defined and reviewed in Section IV. 
Section V analyzes social movement organization strategies in the context of a co-production framework, 
demonstrating the strengths of this approach, and in so doing argues that co-production activities need to 
be understood within a wider political discourse. Section VI discusses these experiences and Section VII 
concludes.  
 
 
II. URBAN POVERTY AND WHY THE STATE HAS AN ESSENTIAL ROLE TO PLAY IN 
POVERTY REDUCTION 
 
It is the combination of spatial characteristics (lack of services and unsafe physical environment) with an 
incapacity to flourish in the cash economy and the denial of legal and political rights that characterizes 
the situation of the urban poor.(2) A number of factors have been identified as being important in the 
creation and maintenance of urban poverty,(3) one of the most notable being the need for income to exist 
with the highly commodified cash economies of towns and cities, and hence the need to enter the labour 
market in order to secure the required income. However, equally evident from existing studies is that 
income alone is unlikely to result in improvements in well-being. Other factors include the lack of basic 
services, discrimination in labour and commodity markets and also in terms of access to services, and the 
lack of political and civil rights.(4) Arguably, it is the addressing of the lack of basic services that has 
been the particular focus of co-production strategies.  
Official statistics on urban poverty rarely take into account the quality of housing or the extent of 
provision of basic services. However, the extent of the deficiencies in provision for, for instance, water, 
sanitation and drainage is well documented, and these deficiencies in provision are not confined to the 
poorer nations or smaller or poorer urban centres.(5) The experiences associated with poverty go far 
beyond monetary incomes. On the one hand, many low-income settlements have some inhabitants with 
higher incomes who are unable to find better accommodation with improved access to services. On the 
other hand, the lack of basic services in many residential locations means that the poor spend a 
considerable proportion of their income on paying private sector enterprises for basic needs such as 
water, transport and health services; also, in many urban centres, for private schools either because there 
are no public schools or because their children are denied access to them. In the case of water, for 
example, it is not uncommon to see a figure of 10 per cent of income being spent on access to water.(6) 
The problems of inadequate access to services go well beyond the high costs of access. In low-income 
settlements in Dhaka, “… poor sanitation, cramped housing, absence of waste removal and inadequate 
ventilation are reflected in high levels of diarrhoeal and respiratory infections…”, and a related problem 
is high expenditure on health care.(7) A later study concludes that “…ill health was the most important 
cause of deterioration in financial status among the Dhaka slum households featured in this paper, 
explaining 22 per cent of cases where households reported deterioration in financial status.”(8) Hence, 
not only do low-income households pay a lot for inadequate access, but the consequences of inadequate 
service provision include poor health and falling incomes. A lack of services causes additional 
difficulties such as the time taken in securing water or simply in travelling to work, leaving less time for 
alternative activities.  
Strategies for securing shelter and basic services are not the only areas where low-income 
citizens have potential for interface with the state. Discrimination is a problem faced in labour and 
commodity markets as well as in residential settlements, increasing the problems faced by some groups. 
Its prevalence is partly related to the lack of appropriate legal and political safeguards and rights, 
meaning that the urban poor are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. Illegality itself is a source of 
discrimination and, in addition to aspects of residency, may be associated with employment and/or 
trading.(9) Laws, norms and standards, even when prepared with good intentions, may result in 
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considerable difficulties for the poor (for example, regulations that determine or influence access to state 
benefits).  
This is the context that the poor have to overcome if they are to move away from poverty. In 
most cases, their context is characterized by a weak state unable to provide basic services and/or the 
conditions under which good quality private support is affordable. There is a prevalence of the informal 
sector. The condition is complex and multi-faceted, with multiple factors that cause and maintain a 
situation of disadvantage that goes significantly beyond low incomes. This condition is linked to state 
actions and inactions including policies, programmes and the general politics of resource allocation. It is, 
to put the case bluntly, impossible for the urban poor to secure improved development opportunities 
simply through improved incomes; much more comprehensive change is required, with a notable 
increase in the ability of city governments to establish systems and structures that produce adequate 
supplies of land and the infrastructure required for the delivery of basic services. In many cases, the 
difficulties associated with particular aspects of their poverty are compounded through discriminatory 
actions by the state and other powerful groups. Addressing these factors requires more wide-reaching 
political and social change.  
However, the urban poor are not passive in this situation. Section III looks in more detail at the 
specific strategies used by the poor to address their poverty, with a particular focus on collective action 
and the interface of local groups with the political system. In their struggles to advance their interests, 
citizens have to build their relations with more powerful structures that function very differently (being 
more formalized) and that protect and promote different values and interests. In some cases, this is with 
the national state, but often it is with local government. It is in part through such struggles that the 
concept of co-production can be analyzed and understood.  
 
 
III. THE MULTIPLE STRATEGIES USED BY THE URBAN POOR TO ENGAGE THE STATE AND 
SECURE ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL SERVICES 
 
Faced with acute needs, very limited financial resources, high levels of commodification and informality, 
and governments with a demonstrated incapacity and/or unwillingness to address needs at the required 
scale, the poor use a number of strategies to improve their development options. Drawing on a previous 
analysis,(10) the strategies of the poor may be (somewhat crudely) grouped into five broad categories:  
 
• Individualized (or household) market-based strategies, in which the poor use avenues of 
labour (and product) market advancement, particularly around income generation, employment 
and education. The resources for such strategies may be secured from other family members, 
who may then receive support as incomes increase. However, the focus of effort is on individual 
advancement within the opportunities offered by existing structures and systems. 
• Collective self-help strategies in which residents of a neighbourhood, workers within a trade, or 
others facing a common need come together to provide collective goods and services. Faced with 
the conditions described above, residents do much to improve their individual situations, 
particularly when they are in fairly stable residential communities. Such strategies are often 
undertaken in the complete absence of any state involvement.  
• Dependency-based strategies, in which the poor broadly accept their structural situation, and 
seek to improve their returns within the current institutional framework by using and extending 
patron–client relationships. The poor seek more advantageous outcomes without challenging the 
structural constraints within these relations. The prevalence of clientelist politics as a way of 
allocating resources in Southern towns and cities has been noted by many.(11) Central to this 
process is the practice of allocating state resources such as services, regulatory approvals and 
public employment, not as rights to those with proven entitlements but, rather, to benefit those 
powerful groups and individuals with the ability to influence the allocation of such resources, 
and a selected number of their loyal clients.  
• Exclusion strategies in which the poor accept the impossibility of advancement through 
“socially acceptable” means, and adopt methods associated with criminality (including both 
personalized criminal behaviour and that associated with groups such as gangs). 
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• Social movement strategies – which are politicized mass action undertaken by collectives of the 
urban poor – in any one of a number of areas. Social movement activities may be concerned with 
the scale and security of income (including collective consumption goods), the defence of 
existing assets, and/or issues of identity and self-determination.(12) Most definitions of social 
movement activity emphasize the collective nature of the process, with at least some explicit 
political demands and rich social interaction that extends beyond formal organizational processes 
and associated alliances and coalitions to organic activities that citizens commit to and 
participate in.(13) 
 
Few strategies identified above involve explicit political action, and most avoid contesting for 
inclusion in more rewarding and developmental social processes. However, just because the politics is 
not explicit does not mean that it is not present. The kinds of citizen actions that are easily recognized as 
social movements are associated with the modern state,(14) and the political systems in at least some 
Southern countries are not necessarily fully “modern”; more traditional forms of politics may favour less 
explicit political strategizing.(15) In this context, it appears that while many of the collective activities 
undertaken by Southern residents may not involve direct political claims, nevertheless through their 
focus on state services (as well as other kinds of resource) they involve some engagement with the state 
and the realm of politics.  
Some collective self-help is commonplace within many low-income and informal settlements 
because there is simply no way in which households can manage their situation without a degree of 
collective action, for example to improve water supplies, establish a common garbage dump, improve 
drainage and reduce pools of stagnant water and/or flooding. Collective action is also needed to develop 
new sites, clear undergrowth and lay out settlements to enable plots to be marked out and to facilitate 
service provision; to provide each other with emergency help, and build and/or improve facilities such as 
schools and community centres; and any other services and facilities that groups agree to provide 
collectively. In some cases, self-help strategies operate entirely without the contribution of the state, even 
though collective self-help is generally provided in areas considered to be the responsibility of the state 
in higher-income countries. Many of these activities link to actual and/or potential state areas of activity. 
In some cases, as Castells describes in Monterrey (Mexico), there is a conscious withdrawal of the 
community from an engagement with the state, however this appears relatively rare and, even in this 
case, accommodation was achieved. The squatter movement in this city rejected state help during their 
first stages of development so as to preserve their autonomy.(16) 
As evidenced by Castells and Pickvance,(17) citizens’ struggles with the state for land and basic 
services are longstanding and remain important in the context of poverty reduction. Movements and their 
organizations have developed a wide range of different tools to further their chances of success. 
Movements may move between autonomy and dependency on party politics and/or clientelist relations, 
and back again in a context that is often fluid. In some cases, movement organizations (such as 
federations and associations) may have explicit party affiliations, but in other cases they see themselves 
as independent. Movements may be confrontational, undertaking demonstrations and other forms of 
direct action, but they may also prefer alternative approaches to secure their objectives. Generally 
speaking, research on social movements has focused on contentious types of movement responses rather 
than on a slow and deliberate occupation of space typically filled by the state.(18) While the first grouping 
of movements identified above may not be interested in co-production strategies, there are more evident 
associations between co-production strategies and the second, third and fifth grouping of strategies used 
by the urban poor.(19) 
Both self-help activism and movement activities are frequently place based, both at a micro level, in 
that people realize their shelter within neighbourhoods (particularly in the case of self-help); and at a 
meso level as the poor struggle for political inclusion (citizenship) at the level of the city (of more 
interest to movements). As acknowledged by Castells and Sassen,(20) much action happens at the level of 
the city. In the case of movements, city-based action is a primary sphere because of the significance of 
local authorities in influencing the conditions under which informal enterprise activity takes place and 
also the rules and regulations, governance, access to land and basic services (see Section II). In some 
countries (for example India, South Africa and Brazil), the provincial level is also important as a source 
of investment finance.  
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The urban poor may engage with the state in a number of areas, such as grievances related to work 
and income, issues related to access to land, basic services (such as water) and housing, other 
consumption-related issues such as food and subsidy payments, and campaigns for greater inclusion (for 
example, on groups of ethnicity, gender or other).(21) In many cases, their positions are defensive, seeking 
to protect what is already there, or where they face a threat of dispossession by other groups (for 
example, struggles against evictions). But on other occasions, the urban poor are more proactive, seeking 
strategies that enable them to advance their interests in the face of continuing and numerous struggles. As 
elaborated in Section V, some such strategies appear to fit within a co-production framework, but at the 
same time go beyond it in terms of their contribution to political reform.  
 
 
IV. THE CONCEPT OF CO-PRODUCTION: GOING BEYOND AN IDEALIZED “WEBERIAN” 
MODEL OF BUREAUCRACY TO THE MESSY REALITY OF DAY TO DAY SERVICE 
DELIVERY 
 
The concept of co-production appears to have come to prominence in the early 1980s, when a particular 
set of citizen–state interaction was “discovered” in US cities.(22) As remarked on in these papers, this was 
in the context of reducing state expenditures, however, a central theme of this work is the recognition 
that state agencies were not unambiguously providing a lower-cost and lower-quality service by 
involving local residents. These authors argued that they might be improving on services because of the 
particular benefits of citizen involvement. Whitaker argues that, in the case of services in which 
behavioural change is sought, participant involvement is likely to be critical to effective service 
delivery.(23) For instance, in the case of crime, he argues, it should be more widely recognized that police 
manage the streets through a set of negotiated interactions rather than the authoritative imposition of 
order. To achieve street security, personal and collective changes are required, with some dependence on 
the participation of local residents.(24) State service delivery organizations recognize that they need to 
catalyze desirable behaviour and that coercive strategies are likely to be limited in what they can achieve. 
As Whitaker points out, to be fully effective in this task, state organizations need to respond in turn to the 
experiences of citizens, if the benefits of co-production are to be realized. This is exemplified in the case 
of agencies addressing domestic violence: “[T]here is a continual shaping of what an agency does by the 
kinds of requests made on it by citizens.”(25)  
A paper published in 1981 develops these observations on the effectiveness of citizen 
contributions to state service delivery through their representation within an economic model.(26) The 
authors distinguish between production functions where the service provider and citizen provider are 
independent and can easily be substituted for each other, and those where a degree of interdependence is 
required. For instance: “Police have very little capacity to affect community safety and security without 
citizen input.”(27) If sectors are substitutes, then it is simply a question of which is the most cost-effective 
for any given scale of production, and the answer depends on the relative costs of each potential supplier 
of the service (wage rates for officials, for example) to the opportunity cost for the citizens. However, the 
authors argue, if they are interdependent (complementary), then some minimum input from one is 
required for any output to be obtained, and the most efficient (and sometimes only) outcomes will be 
when both participate in the production (service delivery) process. In this context, appropriate 
institutional arrangements are critical.(28)  
Generally, and perhaps reflecting much of the way in which government action and development 
processes have been considered, research has focused on the contribution of co-production to service 
delivery rather than looking at more fundamental political issues such as its implications for the 
distribution of power between organized citizens and the state. The research focus has been on joint 
forms of service delivery within contextual and institutional analysis rather than on contributing to new 
forms of democracy and democratic practice.(29) However, there has been some recognition of the 
implications for co-production in citizen involvement and participation. On the one hand, this analysis 
recognized that state power is necessarily limited when dealing with situations where it is reliant on 
changes in human behaviour, for example police, health, education: “…the fundamental point is that 
without active citizen participation the capacity of government to provide public goods and services is 
severely compromised.”(30) Bureaucracies, rather than being cast in the role of all-knowing, all-able 
institutions, are recognized as being institutions that coexist with others, also with a degree of power, 
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with boundary issues that need to be managed.(31) On the other hand, it recognizes that co-production 
extends citizen action into areas where it was previously not present, building skills and capacities, 
including those to recognize and realize collective will; and this is particularly significant in group and 
collective co-production activities.(32) Hence, although much of the literature discussing co-production is 
based within the context of a weak and reducing state, this literature identifies and discusses more 
fundamental and lasting limitations of state power. Moreover, this is not simply a question of cultural 
differences between professional and subaltern groups (the “downtown” streets), with professionals 
needing community participation to relate to the “poor”; research has demonstrated that co-production 
also involves neighbourhood groups in higher-income areas.(33) “The contribution of co-production seems 
to be driven by the need for a different kind of authority for some kinds of service delivery, not one that is 
imposed from above and maintained through coercion but, rather, one that is agreed between the parties 
for the common welfare, and maintained through ongoing social relations and associated group support 
and/or sanctions.” Whitaker ends his paper by reflecting back to a past era in which, he suggests, such 
practices were more common.(34) 
Despite the above discussion, many of those writing about co-production, and particularly those 
writing in the context of development, view it to be a secondary strategy for service delivery, which is 
being used prior to the state gaining in political will and bureaucratic capacity.(35) Ostrom looks at its 
contribution to condominial sewerage systems to address sanitation needs in the northeast of Brazil, and 
to education in Nigeria. She describes a system through which low-income settlements are linked to city 
sewerage systems, by reducing conventional engineering standards and involving local residents in local 
planning decisions, some financing and voluntary labour.(36) Ostrom concludes: “[M]any of these systems 
have been successful and have dramatically increased the availability of lower-cost, essential urban 
services to the poorest neighbourhoods in Brazilian cities.”(37) In a context in which the labour of low-
income residents is underutilized, she suggests that the opportunity costs of citizen labour are low, and 
hence the economics of co-production will favour high inputs from citizens.(38) Joshi and Moore 
summarize two very different examples. The first is an elite intervention to strengthen police services in 
Karachi (Pakistan), the Citizen’s Liaison Committee; and the second is a business association of 
commercial vehicles in Ghana, which collects income tax for the government and provides services at 
lorry parks (the Tanker’s Association).(39) They conclude that in both cases, the organizations “…help to 
fulfil a core state function in response to a clear decline in state capacity”, and that they offer lessons for 
“…other contexts where conventional public provision is under stress.”(40)  
Drawing on her empirical work, Ostrom defines co-production as “…the process through which 
inputs used to provide a good or service are contributions by individuals who are not in the same 
organization.”(41) Joshi and Moore refine this definition to suggest that “…institutionalized co-
production is the provision of public services (broadly defined to include regulation) through regular, 
long-term relations between state agencies and organized groups of citizens, who both make substantial 
resource contributions.”(42) They emphasize that such arrangements are not temporary and may not 
involve formal agreements, rather, potentially being “…undefined, informal and renegotiated almost 
continuously”,(43) in a context in which “Weberian” institutional boundaries are blurred. Both Ostrom and 
Joshi and Moore mention resource contributions.(44) Brandsen and Pestoff differentiate between co-
governance (planning and delivery), co-management (joint production) and co-production (citizen 
production).(45) Bovaird suggests that Ostrom’s definition is now too wide, given the proliferation of 
partnership arrangements, but that Joshi and Moore’s is too narrow, as it only has a focus on state 
agencies and does not consider other professional providers.(46) 
Joshi and Moore, analyzing reasons for co-production in the South, suggest that there are two 
“drivers” that are “…variants of the imperfections or incompleteness of states.” (47) The first is a failure of 
government to provide services (governance drivers), and the second is where the context makes it 
particularly difficult to provide services (logistical drivers) due, for example, to large numbers of clients, 
the need for local variation in service delivery, and a lack of information, personnel and/or authority. 
Bovaird (who focuses primarily on the North) extends the logistical drivers to recognize that, in the case 
of some personal services, client participation is essential (and the example he offers is fitness training 
for obese children), and hence recognizes that while the first driver may be temporary, the second is 
not.(48) Ackerman discusses the contribution of citizen involvement in state activities in the South as a 
way of improving the accountability of the state.(49) Hence, the literature either views the state as 
evolving (and hence co-production as temporary) and/or recognizes the need for micro level 
 7 
collaboration in personal services. But it does not locate co-production within a broader struggle for 
choice, self-determination and meso level political relations in which citizens both seek an engagement 
with the state (to secure redistribution, reduce free riders, etc.) and also are oriented towards self-
management and local control over local provision in areas related to basic needs (i.e. services with 
development significance).  
Bovaird argues that public administration is now recognizing the involvement of service users 
and their communities and that this “…has major democratic implications because it locates users and 
communities more centrally in the decision-making process… [and] demands that politicians and 
professionals find new ways to interface with service users and their communities.”(50) He suggests that 
there is room for system transformation as a result of citizen involvement, “…[o]nce clients and 
community activists become engaged in the co-planning and co-delivery of services alongside 
professional staff, the networks created may behave as complex adaptive systems, with very different 
dynamics from provider-centric services.”(51) However, the cases he examines are either state 
programmes (in which the government sets the parameters of citizen involvement) or are individual 
communities with a very limited reach. Nevertheless, in understanding the orientation and interests of 
some citizen movements in the South in co-production, his comments may offer an insightful starting 
point.  
 
 
V. EXAMPLES OF BOTTOM-UP CO-PRODUCTION IN SOUTHERN TOWNS AND CITIES 
 
The following examples help to illustrate the strategies that have been followed by grassroots 
organizations in Southern towns and cities and illustrate how grassroots associations (either as self-help 
agencies or through their membership of movement type organizations) have used co-production as a 
means to advance access to services and goods that meet basic needs, and also to change the role of 
citizens in relation to the state programmes. They have been selected due to their scale and/or 
significance in terms of national policy. 
In Pakistan, a local NGO the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) developed a new solution to sanitation 
to address the appalling living conditions and related health problems, including high child mortality 
rates in Orangi, a large informal settlement in Karachi.(52) When this work began in 1982, Orangi was on 
the periphery of the city. Some of the communities were represented by residents’ associations that 
followed clientelist strategies to try to improve services. They lobbied local politicians and promised 
votes in return for water pipes and public standpoints. OPP staff argued that such a strategy was never 
going to work at the spatial scale that was required or with an adequate quality of investment. So they 
developed an alternative model whereby the residents of a lane or street paid for the lane investment in 
sanitation while the municipality took on responsibility for the sewer network into which this fed, and 
also the waste treatment plants. At first, the municipality refused to participate in this work and the 
people discharged the wastewater from the lane sewers into nalas (streams). The settlement is relatively 
hilly and gravity carried the waste away. Over time, the authorities recognized that this was a workable 
strategy for sanitation provision, and were more interested in participating in the role that had been 
designed for them. OPP staff have argued in favour of this model of co-produced services from a number 
of perspectives. First, with respect to affordability, they suggested that the state lacked the resources to 
invest adequately. However, despite the lack of state investment, the people paid the costs in terms of 
high bills for health, so they were better off making the small investment (originally costed at about US$ 
20 per household) in lane sanitation. The models of state provision developed in the North were, staff 
suggested, simply inappropriate in lower-income nations. Second, and in respect of state capacity, the 
Northern model assumed that the state had the ability to monitor the quality of investment that was 
taking place and ensure high standards. But corruption was endemic and often the contractors cheated on 
the quality of materials, sometimes in collusion with state officials. Only the people who needed the 
service cared enough to ensure adequate quality; hence they had to be actively involved in preparation, 
management and installation. Equally, having made the investment, the staff argued the people would 
maintain it, while the state could not be trusted to do so. Third, there are benefits to stronger local 
organizations, they suggested, in terms of other development objectives that require citizen action. 
Involvement in sanitation provision has helped to shift residents’ groups away from those concerned with 
using clientelist networks and towards those concerned with representing the interests of their members 
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in a more open and transparent engagement with the political system. What is notable, in this case, is 
how rapidly the idea of community-installed and managed sanitation spread through the informal 
settlement once it was understood. In Orangi, 96,994 houses have built their neighbourhood sanitation 
systems, by investing Rs. 94.29 million (US$ 1.57 million), and similar strategies have worked well in 
many other settlements and other urban centres. Some 20 years after the work began, the city of Karachi 
conceded that this was an effective strategy that should be supported throughout the city. 
A second example of where co-production has been introduced to provide sanitation services can 
be found in the work of the Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia.(53) The federation is a grassroots 
organization made up of women-led savings schemes within very low-income settlements. Many of these 
women lack legal tenure of the land on which they live and wanted to find a way of purchasing 
affordable plots. Together with the city government of Windhoek, the federation devised a policy 
whereby organized groups were able to occupy land with only communal services (i.e. toilet blocks and 
standpipes). The cost of these plots is relatively low, and hence affordable by many of the lowest-income 
women. The women wanted to improve their living conditions and in many settlements, once they had 
secure tenure, they saved or borrowed to be able to invest in individual plot services. In some cases, 
municipal staff supported them with technical assistance. The motivation was very much the need to find 
low-cost solutions so that all members could have the development opportunities that they sought. At the 
same time, there was a broader objective, which was to demonstrate that low-income organized 
communities have a capacity to collaborate effectively with the state to address common problems, and 
that policy making should be open to influence by citizens, rather than simply being seen as the 
prerogative of politicians and professionals. The federation has consistently taken up invitations to 
participate in state processes, including the recent review of housing policy in Namibia. Their experience 
suggests that effective participation in government decision-making processes is enhanced by an active 
engagement with the day to day practicalities of service provision. It is such grounded experience that 
enables the federation and its support NGO to represent policies that are derived from the preferences 
and priorities of their members, designed through low-income women’s everyday struggles and their 
members’ involvement in development projects. To date 3,100 federation members have secured land, 
1,174 of whom have also accessed loans for improved services and infrastructure.(54) The state has also 
recognized these grassroots efforts by offering grant finance to a community loan fund.(55) Those with 
secure tenure who have not taken loans have used their savings to upgrade infrastructure. This is about 5 
per cent of those living in shacks in urban Namibia. 
The use of co-production to create openings for citizen involvement in areas that have been 
reserved for the state within conventional delivery models has been used more widely. The Namibian 
federation belongs to a network of grassroots organizations (Shack or Slum Dwellers’ International 
(SDI)) that have consistently sought to influence policy through entry into delivery and pragmatic 
engagement, rather than through lobbying “from the outside” (Box 1).  
 
 
BOX 1: Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) 
 
Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) is a transnational network of people’s organizations. 
Membership is made up of grassroots organizations, primarily women-led savings schemes based in 
settlements with insecure tenure and inadequate shelter. SDI’s methodology (in summary) uses savings 
to rebuild neighbourhood social capital; peer exchanges to offer skills, ambition and confidence to the 
urban poor; and federative structures to institutionalize learning and negotiate political deals with local, 
city and national governments. A common initial challenge is to find ways in which local residents can 
work together to achieve a locally determined development plan. The methodology is notably resistant to 
domination by professionals – SDI believes the solutions have to emerge from the shack/slum dwellers 
themselves. The activities are centred primarily on tenure security, basic services and, in some contexts, 
housing and/or income generation. Donor finance is used to catalyze state contributions – aiming at 
solutions that can be replicated at scale. What is remarkable is the rapid spread of SDI organizing 
methodologies: ten years ago, there were just six affiliates; current members and associates are listed 
below. This growth suggests that there is evident interest within grassroots communities to work with 
both community initiatives and political change to address the needs of low-income settlements. 
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Fully-fledged federations exist in the following countries: 
• Asia: Cambodia, India, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand 
• Africa: Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Uganda 
• Latin America: Brazil 
 
Savings groups have been formed in the following countries, although fully-fledged 
federations have yet to emerge: 
• Asia: Indonesia, East Timor, Mongolia 
• Africa: Lesotho, Swaziland, Madagascar, Angola 
• Latin America: Colombia  
 
Countries exploring options to engage the SDI network as an affiliate include: 
• Africa: Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
• Latin America: Argentina, Venezuela 
 
 
SOURCE: SDI secretariat and author’s own notes. 
 
 
 
In some cases, SDI affiliates create new construction or installation strategies that the state has 
not previously used. In other cases, they seek to create a devolved citizen-managed space within existing 
state programmes. For example, the South African Homeless People’s Federation negotiated with their 
government to have a distinct component within the state capital subsidy for housing, the People’s 
Housing Process (PHP), that enables citizens to produce housing with the state subsidy rather than 
receive housing produced by private contractors and/or municipal authorities. While the PHP route has 
received only a small proportion of total funds, the experience has been influential in housing policy, 
encouraging an equity component and minimum house size within the other subsidy delivery routes.(56) 
The evident ability of local grassroots organizations within SDI’s network to manage social 
relations at the settlement level leads to other activities. In some cases, government officials have been 
interested in working with SDI affiliates to enhance their capacity to implement their plans. The 
grassroots organizations are motivated to participate because of their need to address the immediate 
needs of their members and the long-term wish to establish their credibility and legitimize the potential 
contribution of their members in state programmes through demonstrated capacity. One of the most 
significant examples of where SDI has responded to a request for help from the state is in the 
resettlement of 20,000 families in Mumbai (India). The state wished to clear the areas adjacent to the 
railway line of all shacks to enable the trains to go faster. However, it was unable to do this in a way that 
prevented spurious claims to entitlements by individual citizens seeking to exploit this commitment for 
personal benefit, and resultant court cases that would delay the project. In this sense, the state recognized 
that it lacked the necessary capacity to manage the complexities of social relations in this informal 
settlement, and that their formal systems were unable to prevent abuse. The grassroots organization (the 
National Slum Dwellers’ Federation) was able to establish a system that enabled entitlements to be 
proven beyond doubt through a mapping system in which residency claims had to be verified by 
neighbours and which local organizations accepted as legitimate.(57) 
An analysis of the experiences of affiliates of SDI suggests that this strategy works for their 
members for multiple reasons. 
 
• Design benefits. It is more effective than lobbying the state for improvements in service 
provision and state intervention in shelter markets because it enables real delivery problems to be 
considered by those who suffer the consequences of poor quality programmes and policies. 
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There are lots of problems in the professional models and they need to be revised, but the urban 
poor design through experience not through abstract conceptual models. 
• Relational benefits. A practical engagement with the state avoids the confrontation often 
associated with the claims of civil society groups that tends to provoke a defensive reaction from 
the state. A practical engagement builds strong positive social relations and, in many cases, there 
are further opportunities for collaboration.  
• Inclusive benefits in terms of local organization. The emphasis on the practical and non-
confrontational encourages low-income women to play a central role in the local process. This 
participation secures one objective of the SDI process, to provide a collective entity through 
which this disadvantaged group can strategize to address their needs.  
• Political benefits. The scale and nature of a mass movement based around women’s engagement 
with their practical development needs is a latent political promise and a threat; politicians are 
drawn into the process in part because they want to secure the electoral support of this group.  
• Empowerment and poverty reduction benefits. Engagement in this process has proved 
effective in encouraging those involved to feel positive about their work and gain growing 
confidence in their skills and capacities. In so doing, it addresses the insidious nature of poverty 
and inequality in which low-income and otherwise disadvantaged citizens are treated as less 
worthy than others.  
 
A further example of co-production by a federation of local residents’ associations is illustrated by 
FEGIP in Brazil.(58) In this case, a people’s organization, the Goiânia Federation for Tenants and 
Posseiros, organized the invasion of public land (common land) so as to provide improved shelter for 
hundreds of thousands of families living in informal rental accommodation. The strategy was successful 
in improving the shelter options of a significant proportion of tenants. Its popularity was evidenced not 
only by the numbers taking part in FEGIP’s own activities but also by the copycat occupations, as other 
residents organized their own autonomous occupations. The federation had to manage difficult relations, 
first with an authoritarian government and then with the transition to democracy, as the state remained 
nervous about the potential power of a separate organizing capacity and sought to weaken FEGIP. This 
experience appears to be insightful in exposing some of the power dynamics and politics behind co-
production and reminding us that an autonomous organizing capacity can be seen as a threat by those in 
power, in part because it adds to the ability of local grassroots organizations to secure outcomes that 
favour the poor, sometimes with costs for political elites.  
In all four examples, organized citizen groups have taken over relational and physical space that is 
typically seen as state “territory” and have reached some level of cooperation with the responsible state 
agencies. In this sense, these examples are all co-production, as traditionally viewed. However, these 
activities have not been promoted by the state and its officials, nor are these examples of provision 
motivated by income generation (which might perhaps be viewed as public–private partnerships). These 
examples are all self-organized co-production, with grassroots organizations engaging the state 
while at the same time maintaining a degree of autonomy within the delivery process. The objective 
is not simply to develop a model that is passed over to state employees to manage and/or to take over as 
the state gains in capacity. The objectives include practical delivery issues – but also more ambitious 
goals to change the way in which the state functions towards a more decentralized form of operation, 
with greater citizen control over state resources (through linkage with citizen action and/or state 
transfers). Not surprisingly, there are differences within the examples considered. OPP’s activities and 
model do not involve extensive support for social movement organizations, as it restricts its role to that 
of professional advisor albeit one providing free advice to low-income communities. Nevertheless, the 
professional intervention is premised on the understanding that previous political practices were not 
working in the interests of those living in low-income settlements, and direct involvement in sanitation 
offers an opportunity for residents’ associations to work differently, and this has been taken up. Other 
institutional interventions by the OPP, and particularly the formation of the Urban Resource Centre in 
Karachi and in other urban centres, have helped to provide a space for citizen public action.(59) The other 
examples are cases where there is an explicit intent to change political outcomes by the citizen groups 
involved in co-production activities. The following section reconsiders the literature on co-production in 
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an attempt to consider the implications of these experiences for existing analytical and conceptual 
frameworks within this area, and to deepen our understanding of these strategies. 
 
 
VI. WHY ARE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS INTERESTED IN CO-PRODUCTION? THE DEVIL IS IN 
THE DETAIL 
 
What does consideration of the examples in Section V add to the analysis of co-production summarized 
in Section IV? This section discusses the extent to which the examples map onto how co-production has 
been considered, and then reflects on the motivations of and strategies used by citizen-led co-production.  
There are evident analytical limitations that arise from a focus on the product of co-production 
rather than on the politics of the process in an attempt to incorporate the examples given above into the 
existing frameworks. As noted in Section IV, much of the analysis, especially in the context of the global 
South, has been from the perspective of the functionality of operational services, i.e. an instrumental 
approach that focuses on how to improve outcomes in terms of the particular service being considered. 
Much less attention has been given to co-production as a political process that citizens engage with to 
secure changes in their relations with government and state agencies, in addition to improvements in 
basic services. Nevertheless, looking at the motivation behind the cases described in Section V, it is 
evident that their engagement with service provision in co-productive enterprise goes well beyond 
service functionality. In particular, all of the activities described in Section V strengthen local citizen 
organization, and in so doing provide a platform for wider civic engagement and greater political 
engagement by the urban poor. The synergy that emerges is not just between state and citizen(60) but also 
between the movements’ engagement in the practical day to day needs of citizens, and their political 
aspirations for political inclusion and redistribution goals; goals that, arguably, can only be achieved with 
an organized mass of citizenry negotiating improved outcomes from the state through a political 
process.(61) 
Reading across the literature and looking at the cases examined in Section V, there are evident 
constraints to what the state can do. This is perhaps more evident in the global South where there is less 
state capacity and greater informality in the lives of residents but, as described above, this has also been 
recognized to be the case in the North.(62) There are systemic weaknesses in a “Weberian” model of an 
authoritative bureaucracy and, in practice, there is a need to negotiate with local citizens to ensure their 
participative involvement, not only with respect to individual changes in behaviour but also because 
some things can most effectively be managed locally, with citizen engagement. Such a reality has 
encouraged many citizen groups to be involved in locally based self-help action. However, grassroots-
organized co-production, with its more deliberate engagement with the state, appears to have a dynamic 
that encourages it to move beyond a local orientation and towards more substantive change. From the 
perspective of citizen groups, interest in being involved appears to be both because such activities 
respond to immediate needs and because it prepares communities for a more substantive engagement 
with the political system, particularly around issues of collective consumption, which enables them to 
negotiate for greater control and additional resources. The cases above operate with a triad of practical 
local action, engagement with the state and some kind of networking or federating above the level of the 
individual neighbourhood. As argued in Mitlin and Muller in the case of Namibia, not only do the co-
production activities help the Shack Dwellers Federation to build strong positive relations with the state, 
but it also helps to advance the political solutions that are believed to be necessary.(63) 
These experiences suggest that the nature of grassroots civil society groups matters in terms of 
their ability to negotiate political outcomes that are favourable to the poor. And, more specifically, that 
the nature of groups arising from a co-production process (practical action, engagement with the state, 
networking of neighbourhood groups) appears to offer particular benefits to the poor, extending political 
practice through drawing in new groups and persuading the state to respond positively. Both our case 
studies and the literature note that this process brings a new kind of citizen into these political activities, 
one who was not previously active. At the same time, in at least some cases, existing leadership chooses 
to become involved, but to practice a different kind of politics. Bovaird argues that the approach draws in 
those who “…want to deal with common concerns at the ‘small politics’” level, concretely and 
personally, but who distrust political parties and old grassroots organization and do not wish to become 
“expert activists”.(64) Abers recognized “ …a new kind of neighbourhood organization emerging in 
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Brazilian cities that refused to play according to clientelist rules”, which used a mixture of pressure and 
protest strategies rather than clientelist negotiations to advance the needs of low-income settlements.(65) 
As in the case of Bovaird: “Few of the participants in the Extremo Sul forum had previously been 
activists – for the most part, they were just ordinary people hoping to improve their neighbourhoods.”(66) 
SDI affiliates are also very conscious that, at least in part, they draw in women many of whom have not 
had previous experience of political involvement.(67) The practical nature of local organizing helps to 
build strong links between residents, resulting in significant demonstrations of popular support, most 
typically through the scale of financial contribution and participation in events (some of which include 
politicians). As one state politician said to an NGO activist at a meeting of more than 5,000 members of 
two Indian grassroots federations that work together in India: “I can see this is not a rent-a-mob.”(68) The 
nature and depth of activism is likely to provoke a positive response from politicians (once they accept 
that they cannot control the process), in part because such groups are not politically aligned and therefore 
have votes that can be secured. 
Jockin Arputham, leader of the National Slum Dwellers’ Federation in India, reflects on the 
unsuccessful nature of past political practice, when grassroots organizations followed union organizing 
practices, because it did not build a sufficiently effective activist base but tended to be oppositional and 
therefore easily dismissed.(69) At the same time, in 1993, he warned the informal shack dwellers in South 
Africa that they could not depend on the forthcoming democratic government to address their needs but, 
rather, needed to organize to further their own interests.(70) With this advice, he highlighted a recognized 
failing of present-day democracy to address the needs of many citizens, particularly those of the lowest-
income groups.  
Grassroots co-production seeks to resolve a paradox. Effective local services available to all 
citizens require some level of local democratic practice, a genuine need to work together (to plan and 
construct infrastructure networks, to identify and support those in acute need); but this is difficult within 
a modern democratic state. State agencies see themselves (whether central or local) as the key agencies 
controlling activities (to the exclusion of others). If supervised by elected politicians, these agencies also 
consider that they have the right to do so, legitimated by the elections. State involvement tends towards 
centralized control and away from those directly involved, and tends to professionalize state activities, 
promoting a very different kind of authority from that of democratic collective practice. Superficial 
participation only in micro-management does not lead to successful community involvement.(71) 
Appadurai has cast the strategies of SDI as “deep democracy”, an attempt to further democratic 
principles such as inclusion, participation, transparency, accountability and redistribution among and for 
the pavement dwellers of Mumbai and their organizational allies (the Alliance).(72)  
This situation is not restricted to the South. Castells’ analysis of the citizen movements in 
Madrid describes both their energy and success,(73) and their demise with the advent of a democratic 
national state(74) that was, at least in part, due to the inability of national party politics to accommodate 
alternative democratic practice.(75) Neighbourhood movements support local identities based on day to 
day interactions and with a strong orientation towards both self-reliance and citizen participation. But the 
very pressure they exert to bringing the state down to the community level is resisted by centralizing 
political forces.(76) Castells argues that these kinds of organized citizen action secured significant success 
with very positive implications for urban development, but that this did not survive the transition to 
democracy because of the inability of citizen groups to manage a political transformation in which their 
leadership was drawn off into political parties and chose to contest alternative political issues.(77) In this 
sense, co-production strategies can be understood as a modern response to the paradoxes of democratic 
will and practice and, as Joshi and Moore suggest, it is a mistake to see these arrangements as relics of 
traditional arrangements.(78) But while Joshi and Moore suggest that the approach is more likely where 
“…public authority is unusually weak”,(79) this argument suggests that this is not necessarily the case.  
Much of the existing literature sees the state as a key instigator of co-production. Evans argues 
that if appropriate local organizations are not in place to promote the required social capital needed for 
co-production, then the most likely candidate to assist in their development is a “…competent engaged 
set of public institutions.”(80) Bovaird also discusses the importance of a sympathetic political elite, and 
identifies the need for politicians to support the contestation of professional roles (after recognizing that 
professionals may be uncomfortable with greater citizen involvement).(81) Ackerman emphasizes the 
importance of the reform-minded bureaucrat in holding the city government to account in Mumbai 
(India), and goes on to conclude that the “…supply side of the equation is crucial. Without a capacity 
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and well-financed state apparatus that can actually respond to popular demands and participation, such 
accountability mechanisms would create more disenchantment than hope.”(82) Abers also recognizes the 
contribution of the state – both in the context of providing the finance for capital investments at 
neighbourhood level and in hiring community organizers who attend neighbourhood meetings and who 
“…reflected a new type of governing that privileged accessibility, flexibility and negotiation.”(83) In part, 
she suggests, this happened because the political interests of the party in power, the PT (Workers’ Party), 
coincided with those of the neighbourhood organizations: “…both sought a transparent process through 
which neighbourhoods could obtain access to government infrastructure and services.”(84)  
Our analysis suggests that the contribution of the state may be more ambivalent that these 
authors suggest. FEGIP, despite its very considerable contribution to meeting the needs of the lowest-
income groups, found that the transition to democracy in Brazil did not result in appreciation and support 
but, rather, the state continued to consider grassroots organizing a threat: “..the government tried to 
weaken the posseiros
(85)
 movement by offering public services and state housing programmes. During the 
dictatorship, the repression of the urban posses was brutal and vicious; today, the repression is more 
subtle and polite.”(86) As evident in FEGIP’s experience, the reaction of the state is ambivalent – it would 
prefer to retain control, and it may consider organized communities to be a threat rather than an 
opportunity. In part, this relates to the prevalence of clientelist politics to manage resource scarcity and 
support existing political interests. Avritzer, in his account of the development of participatory budgeting 
in Porto Alegre, explains that the initial negotiating position of the PT (Workers’ Party) was that local 
assemblies should not have decision-making powers, but that these should be vested in a citywide 
structure, and that participation should be by individual citizens, not as neighbourhood associations 
(leading to the withdrawal of one of the unions of local associations from the process in the early 
1990s).(87) 
The notable conclusion with respect to the experiences in Section V is that these social 
organizations have managed in spite of the state rather than because of them. In the case of Pakistan, the 
negotiations have taken many years and only recently has substantive progress at the city and national 
level been achieved.(88) For FEGIP, as elaborated above, the state has been ambivalent. In the case of the 
national federations of slum and shack dwellers that are affiliates of SDI, the state response has been 
mixed. Governments wish to be seen to be positive but use a range of arguments to limit their 
commitment. They may resist formalizing inclusion into government policy-making groups by arguing 
that those residents not organized by SDI are not representative of all interests, and they cannot be seen 
to be making a special case. Bureaucracies may resist federation attempts to secure community 
management for fear that standards will not be maintained.(89) However, SDI’s experience is that the 
adoption of co-production strategies in terms of basic services helps to draw a positive response from the 
state. Just as Whitaker concludes in respect of US cities that making positive demands on state agencies 
encourages those agencies to be more responsive and increases the likelihood that, in at least some cases, 
the state will shift from being authoritative to being willing to negotiate.(90) By being proactive in what 
they offer, the experiences of groups such as those described in Section III show that they encourage the 
state to change, offering new alternatives to conventional forms of state delivery. As described in the 
cases of Namibia, Pakistan and India above, and as elaborated by Abers,(91) this happens in part because 
the state begins to understand how these strategies can contribution to state functions and/or political 
objectives. However, it also happens because of political realities – governments resist until they judge it 
to be in their political interests to negotiate. However, state-sponsored co-production may be limited in 
what it can achieve, in part because of such ambiguities. Avritzer, in a deeper analysis of participatory 
budgeting in Porto Alegre and other Brazilian cities, concludes that the spread of the approach is 
successful in improving access by residents of low-income settlements to public goods, but that, 
especially in the smaller cities, “… it is not possible to see changes in democratic practices such as 
greater participation of associated actors in decision-making processes at the local level.”(92) The 
effectiveness of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre and some other larger cities is, he suggests, more 
related to the pre-existing political culture of the area, which helped to prepare the ground for a new way 
of interacting with the public administration.  
A deeper analysis is helped by Foucault’s work on governmentality and state power. Foucaldian 
analysis helps provide a framework through which we can understand the strategy of co-production. Co-
production (whether promoted by the state or civil society) strengthens civil society capacity; it teaches 
these groups new things and new ways of acting and, in particular, it strengthens collective practice.(93) In 
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the case of Extremo Sul (the district discussed by Abers), “...the policy also tended to promote 
cooperation among neighbourhoods. This is because the dynamics of decision making in the forums not 
only encouraged neighbourhood associations to mobilize residents but also to make alliances with other 
neighbourhoods.”(94) The national federations that are affiliates of SDI strengthen local organizations 
with savings, a process requiring regular day to day contacts between neighbours, and then link the 
savings groups through federations; federating is a critical link whereby local groups are drawn into 
processes that both emphasize their solidarity one with another (resisting individualization) and create a 
political union able to negotiate directly with the state. Individualization, according to Foucault, is one of 
the ways through which the state reinforces its own power through its control of individuals.(95) As these 
examples demonstrate, the process of co-production resists individualization, both increasing the density 
of working relations between groups and strengthening their consciousness about the benefits of such 
collaboration.  
Co-production also provides an arena within which to challenge particular modes of 
governmentality, or the systems and processes of government in various dimensions.(96) The processes of 
government include the concepts, techniques and rationalities through which services are delivered. As 
civil society gains knowledge of the processes of the state (through co-production), so it occupies such 
spaces of governmentality in its own right. As Appadurai notes, it may be argued that in so doing, 
community organizations merely replicate oppressive tendencies of the state. But in his observations of 
the federation in Mumbai, he draws more positive conclusions: “…my own view is that this sort of 
governmentality from below, in the world of the urban poor, is a kind of counter-governmentality, 
animated by the social relations of shared poverty, by the excitement of active participation in the 
politics of knowledge, and by its openness to correction through other forms of intimate knowledge and 
spontaneous everyday politics.”(97) Drawing conclusions across a range of examples is clearly difficult. In 
practice, it is likely that in some cases citizen groups succeed in occupying these spaces and making 
them their own; and in others, such groups take on the interests of state. As an agent of the state, it might 
be argued, lower-cost services might be achieved, but little contribution is made towards broader issues 
of democratic practice. In all of the examples above, civil society groups have been able to engage 
actively with the practical improvements that they require in state-financed service delivery, as a result of 
their direct involvement in service provision and hence their interface with the rules and regulations of 
the state.  
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has reviewed experiences with co-production in the context of citizen action and social 
movement strategies. In many cities of the South, the evident weakness of the state and issues of 
affordability increase the size of the constituency that supports self-help. However, the perspective of the 
citizen groups profiled here goes well beyond the immediate material advantages of co-production. As 
shown above, a number of grassroots organizations have sought to develop and sustain co-production 
approaches both because of the immediate benefits to service delivery and also to achieve a broader set 
of political objectives. Co-production is attractive to movements both because it strengthens local 
organizations and because it equips these groups with an understanding of the changes in state delivery 
practices that are required if they are to address citizen needs (particularly in the area of collective 
consumption). As a result of their direct engagement, they are better equipped to campaign for the 
required changes through an understanding of service delivery at multiple levels.  
Arguably, such a process fits well within the informal practices that prevail in many low-income 
settlements. As Bovaird elaborates, co-production helps to achieve change through recognizing the 
“…need to reconceptualize service provision as a process of social construction in which actors in self-
organizing systems negotiate rules, norms and institutional frameworks rather than taking the rules as 
given.”(98) Rather that expecting low-income residents to adopt the professionalized practices of the rich, 
co-production builds on much more familiar social relations, albeit within a context of transparency and 
practical collaboration between state and citizens. Rather than looking back at a romantic idea of how 
things used to be, co-production offers a chance to address systemic weaknesses in a “Weberian” model 
of service delivery to identify new solutions that support local democratic practice as well as improved 
services. 
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Finally, it should be noted that not only does co-production help to address the political and 
material needs of those living in low-income settlements, it also helps to build a consciousness of self-
worth among these residents who become aware of their own central contribution to progressive social 
change.  
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